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Abstract 
Axiomalics and logical inferences siand on the basic universe ()f objects and possibly have 
chan耳esas the constructive assumptions on the universe change. Epistemolugical siudy may 
parl iじularlyplay an importatll ro1e in suじhcases 
O. General Introductiol1. 
1t seems that any logical subject which is raised in philosophy may not always 
he directly transferred to mathematical logic. 1n effect， ethical or theological 
subjects very often hmァethis character and so it may be di百lcultto put them 
forward in any mathematical logic ullless we modify thcm on somc conditions 
to rcstrict them exactly. 
If logic is taken on some scienti五csubject， itshall havヒ itsavailable field 
to be found in some total set U of scienti五cobjects， sayラ aprimitive universe 
of objects. So then our esscntial form of investigatioll shall naturally depend 
011 the observational behavior toward the events given or de五nedin the universe. 
The events being defi.ned in the universe are also naturally connected with a set 
theory in it. For purposes of mathematical development， predicates and relations 
may be interpreted as predicates of which loci are sets in U and relations be-
tween sets respectively. The logic which conforms to such views is called an 
anα~lytic logic. 
If any subject is to be reconstructed to fi.t in with the analytic logic， we 
will then have an observational work of testing the possibility of such a recon-
structron. 
There are some statements which have hitherto been considered as of static 
日tateラ but，when practicality is emphasized， are forced some chrono-logical recon幽
structions and are shifted to be of historical genre. The following well-known 
prima-facie paradoxical statement may also be reconstructed as a historical one: 
Etilllcllidcs thc CγeUlIl saツS"Nothillg said by a Cr，ιUUl is t/w casc" ， 
(0. 1) 
The discussion 011 this satcment will be shown in Sect. 2. 
The assi厚nationof truth on events taken in this paper is either“true円。r
“false"， because the empiricist set theory adopted here as the ground for analytic 
オ紀国字予芳郎
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logic is properly taken as of 2・valuedsystem. 1n the empiricist set theory ordi-
nals larger than the 3rd class are refrained from using unless with some special 
conditions. Besides， we have recently begun to refer to the following dogma. 
Pragmatist Dogma. A completly unfounded mere必stractioncan give only 
a meaningless object. 
Under this dogma， for any bounded increase of sets in a euclidean space 
(A，) (，ε1) (，:(κ.と今.A，cA) (Vcε1) (A，cB) (伝B<∞)(帝王 meaningthe a priori 
nleasure)，ザitis generally true that if 
(V，EI) (A， ism-measurable) 
αnd 
A口 UA"
then A is m-叩 easurableωld
五iiA= sup 1.認A" (0.2) 
then the following important result is directly concluded1l; 
There can exists no ordinal which may corre学ondto the continuum (in 
the emjうricistρragmatism). 
Traditionally， a euclidean space itself is the one accomplished by human con-
siderations in line with the euclidean geometry and wIth the cartesIan geometry， 
and moreover is thought to be connected with the general dynamics since more 
than twenty centuries ago. Therefore， ifa set theory is posited to be applied 
in a euclidean space， itcannot only be composed by axioms simply arranged 
consistently， but each axiom of it must always be examined if it does not go 
counter to any traditional character expected in a euclidean space. Eventually， 
a theory of sets in a euclidean space cannot always， as hitherto taken， be equiv-
alent to a one generated by a finite system ofaxioms， but it should be an 
observational course of study of the space whatever axioms are therefor chosen. 
Nuisances occurred in the classical set theory shall hence be considered as caused 
only by processes monopolized by the set thoryラ andtherefore euclidean spaces 
themselves may have no ascription for them. The above-mentioned provisional 
proposition (0.2) in respect to the品measuremay also issue from such obser-
vational discussions， the detail of which will be shown in Sect. 6. 
1. Anal ytic Predicate 
To a set lV[ in a universe U， the following predicate p may be defined to 
correspond ; 
xεM 仁三手・px;x~ M. <-=う・.-..-px;
pU三三{xJxεU.&. トpX*l}= M. 
*)トp.xrenders“x satis:fies p" or“'p.x is true". 
(2 ) 
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Such a predicate p is an analytic 1うredicateof the 1st species (standing) on U. 
In two universes U]) U2， two sets Mj c二U])M2 c U2 be respective1y given， 
then if f is de五nedby 
xEJl.1j・←でち .frモJl.12ラ (1. 1) 
f may be considered as a mapping from Mj onto M2' though it is， in our 
theory， called an analytic predicate of the 2nd species. In case of (1.1)， we 
wnte 
fM1=M2 
and always assume that 
f)2う=φ.
A predicate :finitarily2) composed by means of a :finite number of ana1ytic 
predicates is a1so called analytic on condition that it is meaningful. A de:finition 
of meaninεβLlness of an analytic predicate will be shown in Sect. 3. Incidentally， 
whether a given predicate is meaningless or not may not be decided without 
any observational examination. 
If two predicates p and q are both possible (i. e吋 meaningfuland their 
ranges are both non-void) and if 
pq=qp， (1. 2) 
then they are said to be (mutually) lzomogenetic. Homogenetic predicates may 
be considered to be of the same 1evel， so that the relation (1. 2) may be adopted 
as a de五nitionof equilevelness of p and q. 
2. Analytic Modality 
For a statement 1) describing a proposition， there may be referred to the 
following four modalities: (i) It is ρossible that p; (i) It is imlうossiblethat p ; 
(ii) It is necessaワ thatp; (iv) It is not necessary that p. IfトP (i. e.， that p 
is true) is proved under a certain circumstance (i. e.， a set of conditions of the 
objects in the given universe)， the circumstance is said to be fa-uorable for p. By 
トpjσ
we mean that p is true under the circumstanceσ. Then， iff)ト isthe collection 
of al favorable circumstances for p， f) _ the collection of al favorab1e circum-
stances for "'_'}J， and if 
f)=Q+U{.J←， 
then we have 
(VσεQ十)(トpjσ); 
(VσEQ_) (ト，._qjσ); 
(3 ) 
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hence 
(VσεQ)(ト1'/σ.v.ト，-..，.p/a)ー
E1ements of ρare called l'幽circzll7zst，αηces.
The above醐statedfour moda1ities are found to hc equivalent to the fol1owin符
four re1ations respective1y: 
(i) Q+弓と必， (i) [J十=必， (iii)β ±必， (iv)ρ 学必.
If[J学必，p is said to be rneaningful， and if Q =必，rneaningless. Such being 
the conditons， the four modalities may a1so be thought as analytic relations. 
If a special condition r isto be emphasized in treating p， itmay be done 
by only choosing circumstances which imply r from Q or taking ρ八rinstead 
of p. In such cases we are to examine whether jJ is under r meaningfu1 or 
not. The pragmatist meaning1essness (in regard to the pragmatist dogma) shou1d 
a1so be εxamined， and to rule out this kind of meaninglessness is a1ways requisite 
to have a course of empiricist pragmatism. 
3. Hi日toricalObservation 
When any observation of {act日 hasbeen needed， its procec1ure has been 
taken as non-1ogica1 anc1 according 10 its bcarings called syntheUc orωψ11・ical.
If a proposition has been considered neither necessari1y true nor necessari1y 
fa1se， ithas been said to be factual 3l • However， in our present theory， a factua1 
event may be simp1y said to be a possible event ifρ十弓との. A proof of possibi1ity 
of an event (or a proposition) (~ wi11 be gained if an evidence or a (circumstance) 
σis rea11y found such thatト叫σ，or if it is concluded that there shou1d exist 
at 1east one such evidenceσThis process of proof may a1so be said to he an 
observation， and such an observation sha11 a1so be a 10gica1 observation. 
For examp1e of an event in contact with observation we may refer to a his-
torical statement. Incidentally， since historical events essentially refer to chrono幽
logical objects， they are very often transferred to stochastics. By the way， on 
examining the logical treatment of the prima-facie paradox (0.1)， a historica1 
inspection is reasonably found to be possib1e， so in the followin只 weshow a 
sketch of it. 
Let Jt' render "Epimenidesヘand，.， "nothing said by a Cretan is the case". 
Then， (0.1) may be res01ved into the following two events: 
E is a Cretan; (3. 1) 
and 
E says 8. (3.2) 
So we may reconstrue it as (O.1)=(3.1)^(3.2). 
About the statement (0.1)， some classical 10gicians asserted that since， by 
(3.1)， (3.2) itself refers to the objects of瓜 (0.1)is regarded as selj:r，げ白切ltial
(4 ) 
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and this relation should be the cause of the paradoxy of (0.1). However， such 
a mere assertion ca.nnot be said to have exhausted the observational materials 
related to (0.1). In effect， in inspecting 8 itself， we五ndthat: 
S is false if there is at least one true Cretan utterancel)フ (3.3)
or 
8 is up to now true if there， up to now， isno true Cretan utterance. 
(3.4) 
In case of (3.3) it must be that E says a falsehood and in case of (3.4) it 
must be pending whether E says a falsehood or (0.1) gives a paradoxical evi-
dence， because， in future， (0.1) will be transferred to the case of (3.3) as soon 
as there will emerge a true Cretan utterance. Thus our inquiry is related to 
the historical observation. Incidentally， that 8 is only pendingly possible may 
be considered to force an observation referring to the aristotelian concepi of 
“'jItture contingency川
Ultimately， the obscrvational content of (0.1) may be decided either such that 
E said民 butS is false， 
。rsuch that 
(3.5) 
(0.1) is a pεnding paradox unless any true Cretan utterance is {ound. 
(3.6) 
Hence， itmay be said that (0.1) has a construction of historical dilemma in 
pending between (3.5) and (3.6). 
4. On 3 
That logic might admit a third intermediate truth value in addition io thε 
values of truth and falsehood， might be taken as already implied in the aristo幽
telian notion of“future contingency". On the other hand， for the introduction 
of such a value， itmay give a clear mark to define it to indicate a truth-status 
ihat is“possible but not necessary". Noting the value of such a status as 1 
(truth as T and falsehood as F)， the truth-table of the :3-valued system of 
Lukasiewicz is found as follows6): 
Prima facie it seems thai we may take an event of pending state to be 
assigned the value 1. But， in this case， ifwe do not cease to consider that 
a proceeding of observation may cause a shift of evaluation， the fixed meaning 
of the value 1 may possibly vanish away. 
(5 ) 
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If we take 1 as indicating no pending state， we will then naturally have 
both cases (i) and (iv) cited in Sect. 2， i.e.， 
Q+弓との.&.ρ一手必
on condition that 1 is the truth-value of)J. Then， ifwe restrict circumstances 
within ρ+ we have p as of T and ~p as of F， and if within [2_ p as of F 
and ~p as of T. Therefore in these relative cases， the calculus is su伍ciently
provided by the 2・valuedsystems. Thus，)J and ~ p should always have their 
ranges as complemental， so it would ipso facto be unnatural to assign the same 
value 1 to both of p and ~p. 
Such being the conditions， itwill be rather rigorous if we assert only 
2・valuedsystem can generally refer to analytic logic. However， iflogic is used 
on restriction that only some sort of physical phenomena is taken to make the 
primitive universe and 1 refers to a certain neutral state of phenomenon， where 
T refers to a certain positive state and F to a certain negative state， and no 
other value than 1， T， F is taken possible， then the 3・valuedsystem generated 
by 1， T and F may be considered to be possible as a special system of inferences 
thereupon produced. 
5. Euclidean Geometry 
In history， the clarification of the relation between the euclidean geometry 
and the axiom of parallels made two geometries admitted as possible， though 
this problem might， in the early days (e. g.， the days of G. Saccheri)， possibly 
be regarded as a pendig one， say a historical dilemma. On being broken the 
state of dilemma， there emerged the above bifurcation of geometry一thatwould 
be said to be a result of the outside-standing observation afterward made. 
However， it is reflected， in our view， that there is yet left another way of 
observation on epistemological standpoint. 
After extending the conception of a space which firstly was comprehended 
in an a priori form of intuition to what has been idealized as a space which is 
everywhere homogeneous and spreads unboundedly， there should exist no con‘ 
tradiction between the space itself and the human sight which may be regarded 
as the original one of the idealization. In this meaning we call αpriori乎αce
the above-stated idealized one. Not in mathematics but instead in epistemology， 
the conception of the a priori space shall precede the system ofaxioms. Thus， 
the euclidean system ofaxioms may eventually be said to be a sort of protocol 
of human results of the epistemological work tried to embody the spatial con・
struction of the a priori space. 
The eulidean system has been thought to be ipso facto correct， and almost al 
of the scientists have admtted both of the euclidean and non-euclideain geometriesへ
ネ) In our view， ifthe problem of consistency of the euclidean system is askecl， itshal be trans-
ferecl to the c1iscussion of theoretical noises in connection with historical improvements. 
( 6) 
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However， there is no definition of a“plane" in the euclidean plane geometry. 
1t seems to refer to the axiom of parallels again. 1n this respect， we will here 
posit one epistemological (or physical) course of conjecturing to reach an asser-
tion of the axiom. 
For a given triangleムABC，let it be that AB l_ BC and BC =∞ Then 
the following epistemo嗣physicalverdict will be found to be rightly implemental. 
Postulate B (Bird's Eye Conformiり). To compare L_A and L_B of the 
abozァe・.statedtriangle is equivalent to compare them on alternative conditions 
BC=l aηd AB=O. 
An illative ground of this assertion may straightforwarcUy be obtained by 
the relation 
1/∞=0. 
If what is called a plane should be everywhere homogeneous and unboundedly 
spread with no bending， the bird's eye sight which today is possible for everyone 
to experience if he only emberk in an observation balloon will directly convince 
him of the above conformity. Though a finite system ofaxioms gives us a 
space thereby generatable， itmay then leave no room for incorporation with 
additional convictions approached through human direct intuition. 1ncidentally， 
the following remark due to J. Wallis may be considered to bear the same asser-
tion as Postulate B:グthereis a geometry lacking the axiom of prallels， two 
configurations of d俳 rentsizes must al切りsbe non由homologousin it. 
6. Subsidiary Observation on :m-おfeasure
1n the following we will proceed our discussion under the presupposition 
that our a priori space completely conform to the 3-dimensional euclidean ge-
ometry and if any theory of sets or measures on this space comes accross a 
contradiction its cause must wholly be implied within the theory itself. When 
1. Kant presented the a priori form of space， ithad not ipso facto to consist 
of points but to be only an extensive spread of the space， and after it was 
idealized and provided with homogeneity to establish the a priori space the first 
nextly requisite concept had to be the unit length and then the unit cube. That 
may be to say that in epistemology the concept of continuum itself precedes the 
other elements incorporated into the space. We may take the relations today 
considered to hold between points and the space (or， points and the continuum) 
as the results ultimately obtained through hands of Zenon， F. B. Cavalieri， G. 
Cantor， J.W. R. Dedekind etc. That the concept of i混同measuremay be thought 
to be essentially implied in the naive conception of the a priori space may now 
similarly induced as in the case of the Tlotion of continuum. 
1n speci五cationof iふmeasure，it must deservedly be taken into account that 
the 綴-valueassigned to a geometric五gureshould coincide with the notion of 
size which is used by the spatial occupation of the五gure. Promised such an 
(7) 
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epistemological stipulation， the mathematical notion of 弘.measureshall be called 
a priori measure. Thus the theories of sets and m-measure are considered to 
be through some out-standing observations scrutinized. Therefore， ifneglectin只
such mutual stipulations they were simply formalized and transferred to symbolic 
logic， there might be left important omissions. 
For al the mentions in the above， ifwe are inquired “What shall then be 
actually con五rmed?"， we may not easily answer， because no structural coniIrmか
tion may be gained without oberving types of configuration， whereas such types 
must possibly exist infinitely variously. However， the following announcement 
shall yet deserve to be taken as a fundamental con負rmationin the present course. 
Postulate M1 (Size Conformity). iみmeasureof a set must be proρortional 
to the size of the set so that， forαny bounded incnω'ie*! (AJ (1 E 1)， itmust be 
destined材 ) that for any positive real number e 
伝(A-A，)<ε
τvith 
A=UA， 
if 1 is sufficiently 1m詐・
We yet put forward two more subsidiary assertion日.
Postulate Mzバ(Nullλf必F仰αωS刷ur，問'eAs‘s♂rtμiο叫 As、.¥'Uf
(何VNcNl)(凹Ni.βsi伝元-mωsuωraα必blたe.ご今';>.in，N=O削)， 
then it must be t抗hαωtM i的おιZfiゐ:si綴品混ル幽meωαS抑μraαbl♂ αηιd f 
inM=O. 
Postulate M3 (Mea、surePragmatism). If it is not destined that mノM~α< ∞ラ
then there must be αset N such that Nc M， N is 1:五・mea:仰 rableαnd i五N>α.
As the reasonable ground for illating Postulates M2 and M:1， the pragmatist 
dogma may be very powerful斗同) Thus we iInd it well国providedto conclude 
pragmatistly that if in the bounded increase (AJ αlA， αre ?五・measurablethen 
A =cU A， isalso m-measurable and 
inA=sup mA. 
Thenラ asauggested in Sect. 0， we may conclude that there can exist 710 ordinal 
切 hichmay correspond to the continuum. 
7. Epistemo.physical Characterization 
Since C. Huyghens， physics has ceased to take any part of the cosmic space 
to be vacuum. Hence， ifmathematics intends to hold on in concert with physics， 
ネ) i.e.， I~κ ・0 ・A ， çA向乱nd (，</ξJ)レ1ιヒlJ)(mβく∞)ー
料) “It is d田 tinedthat必C<日"renders “If C is必-measurable，then 'IIJCくが'・
*料) However， we shal not abuse this dogma， for instance， automatically to deny the notIon 
of“any real nuber' 
(8) 
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it may not deny the hypothetical structure that the a priori space is everywhere 
homogeneously五l1edwith a quantitative matter. The huyghensian structure of 
the space may not original1y be the one that regards the space to consist of 
points. However， a set theory in a euclidean space cannot be without the notion 
of point as element. SO， we ultimately may not have any other way than to 
assume each point has its point-weight and 勿'Ais understood to be the total 
sum of point-weights contained in a set A. Such an assumption will give an 
epistemo-physical characterization to the a priori space. Let this assumption be 
cal1ed the postulate of physical conformity. 
However， the point-weight must， as it is， be measured as =0. SO， in order 
to keep harmony， itshould be posited as an infinitesimal quantity. Then， niA 
will turn to be meaningless if its integral construction with respect to the point-
weights is unsolved. Such being the conditions， to proceed on the ground of 
the physical conformity is found to be more annoying than to proceed 011 the 
只roundof the size conformity. So then to mathematics it will only be a burden 
to concert with the huyghensian physics. However， we may here五ndan alle崎
viate course in avoiding the direct work on the assertion that al results derived 
from th正 gpoundof the size conformity do not ipso facto contradiet the physical 
conformity. 
By tht、way，ihcre is a case where ean be induced a deei呂ionwhich is 
hesitated to make in pure mathematieal bearings， by taking the standpoint of 
physieal conformity. In effect， ifa bounded set A (i. e.， Acl¥1. & .inM<∞) is 
not i語i，-measurable，then there may be no other way than to consider it as having 
an oscil1ating wei只ht. This should mean that A is in an indeterminate state-
henee A should be taken as an indeterminate set. 
λ[，川仰IピrticalSl!millal‘イゲ f!Jpfylul"orrm Jnst. Tch. J-l，οkkai山
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